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NOTES-
CONTRACTS
INADEQUACY OF FACTUAL BASIS FOR ENFORCING
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS
Under facts strikingly similar to those involved in the
leading New York case of Allegheny College v. National Chau-
tauqua County Bank of Jamestom, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has reached a directly opposite result.
A charitable subscription signed by Lidie M. Voshell
read in part as follows: "In consideration of my interest in
Christian Education and in consideration of the mutual
promises of other subscribers to the American University
fund of $6,000,000 for endowment, buildings, betterments,
equipment, liquidation, and expenses, I hereby promise and
will pay to the American University . . . the sum of One
Third Of My Estate... ($1/3 of my estate) ...." This stand-
ard form, which is substantially a copy of the one involved
in the Allegheny case,2 provided that the subscription was
to become due on the date of death and to be paid within
one year thereafter. There was also a clause providing that
the donation was to be known by the donor's name. After
the death of Mrs. Voshell, the university made a demand on
her administrator for one-third of the estate. The claim
was rejected and in the university's action for the payment,
the administrator's demurrer to the complaint was sustained.
On appeal the judgment was affirmed. The court, brushing
aside the question of consideration, held that this was an
attempted testamentary disposition and hence void under the
Wills Act.3  Care was taken, however, to point out that the
university had not incurred obligations or taken substantial
1. 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
2. In the Allegheny case the pledge was for the specific sum of$5,000 while in the present case the pledge was for one-third of the
pledgor's estate. Also in the Allegheny case the deceased pledgor
had paid $1,000 of the pledge before repudiating it. Neither of these
factors would seem sufficient to require that opposite results be
reached.
3. At page 335 of the opinion the court said in effect that it is
unnecessary to decide the question of consideration since the pledge is
testamentary in character. This is obviously untrue, for as the court
itself points out in the following paragraph, had a binding contract
been completed (in other words had there been consideration) the
Wills Act would have no application,
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action in reliance on the subscription, and previous Mary-
land cases 4 were distinguished on this ground. American
University v. Collings, 59 A.2d 333 (Md. 1948).
Almost without exception courts have avowed that con-
sideration is necessary to the enforceability of charitable
subscriptions.5 It is a much-remarked fact however, that the
"consideration!' required to make charitable subscriptions en-
forceable would often not have been sufficient to support
other contracts.6 This becomes apparent from a brief review
of the devices by which courts have held subscription promises
binding.
One judicial device for finding consideration is to hold
that the subscriptions of others provide the necessary con-
sideration.7 The difficulty with this approach is that the
promise in charitable subscription cases is made directly to
the organization, and no case has been found where it was
established that the subscriber even knew of the other sub-
scriptions. Thus from a factual standpoint the finding of
consideration in promises of others cannot be justified.8
4. Erdman v. Trustees of Eutaw Church, 129 Md. 595, 99 Atl.
793 (1917); Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113 (1854).
5. In nearly every case on the subject, there is a statement to the
effect that consideration is required: e.g., I & I Holding Corp. v.
Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E.2d 532 (1938); Baker University
v. Clelland, 86 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1936). The Indiana courts have
come as close as any court to repudiating this doctrine. In Roche v.
Classical Seminary, 56 Ind. 198, 202 (1877), the Supreme Court states,
"No consideration is necessary except the accomplishment of the pur-
pose for which the subscription is taken." Even this statement implies
that accomplishment of the purpose or promisory estoppel is necessary.
6. In the vast majority of cases, the courts find some form of
consideration and hold the subscriptions legally enforceable. For col-
lections of the cases see annotations, 151 A. L. R. 1238 (1944); 115
A. L. R. 589 (1938); 95 A. L. R. 1305 (1935); 38 A. L. R. 868 (1925).
The courts themselves have rcognized that this result would not be
attained had the strict law of contract been applied. See the opinion
of Judge Cardozo in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County
Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 372, 159 N. E. 173, 174 (1927):
. . . though professing to apply to such subscriptions the general law
of contract, we have found consideration present where the general
law of contract . . . would have said that it was absent." Se6 also
the periodicals cited note 15 infra.
7. Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347 (1894); Bryan v.
Watson, 127 Ind. 42, 26 N. E. 668 (1890); Higert v. Trustees of Indi-
ana Asbury University, 53 Ind. 326 (1876); Irvin v. Lombard Uni-
versity, 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N. E. 63 (1897).
8. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 116 (Rev. ed. 1936). This idea is
found for the most part in very early cases, and even then it was
seldom that a court relied entirely on this ground. Billig, The Problem
of Consideration in Charitable- Subscriptions, 12 CORN. L. Q. 467, 475
(1927). Several Indiana cases, while declaring that the promises of
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Another method, somewhat more defensible than the
first, is to find consideration in the accomplishment of, or
implied promise to accomplish, the purpose for which the sub-
scription was taken.9 The basic objection to this approach
also is factual: such accomplishment of purpose or implied
promise is not bargained for by the subscriber in exchange
for his promise.10 The very idea of charity negatives the
idea of bargaining for charitable subscriptions. It suggests
rather "benevolence" or "assistance given without return.""
Probably the method most often used by courts to hold
subscriptions enforceable is to resort to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.12  If reliance is admitted to be either
sufficient consideration or a recognized substitute for con-
sideration, there is still the general requirement that the
promise relied upon must be such that the promisor should
have reasonably expected it to induce substantial action or
others are sufficient consideration, take care to point out that there
are other elements of consideration present. Scott v. Triggs, 76 Ind.
App. 69, 131 N. E. 415 (1921); Petty v. Trustees of the Church of
Christ, 95 Ind. 278 (1883); Pierce v. Ruley, 5 Ind. 69 (1854).,
9. In this analysis the subscription is regarded as an offer sub-ject to the acceptance of the organization. See, e.g., First Trust and
Savings Bank v. Coe College, 8 Cal. App.2d 195, 47 P.2d 481 (1935);
Board of Home Missions v. Manley, 129 Cal. App. 541, 19 P.2d 21(1933); Cutwright v. Preachers' Aid Society, 271 Ill. App. 168 (1933);
Twenty-third Street Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601, 23 N.
E. 177 (1890); Eastern States Agricultural and Industrial League v.
Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 124 Atl. 568 (1924). The courts have then said that
a unilateral contract is completed on the accomplishment of the pur-
pose of the subscription, or that the acceptance of the subscription
raises an implied promise to carry out that purpose, thereby forming
a bilateral contract. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bryn Mawr
Trust Co., 87 F.2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1936); First Trust and Savings Bank
v. Coe College, 8 Cal. App.2d 195, 47 P.2d 481 (1935); Barnette v.
Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N. E. 427 (1893); Roche v.
Roanoke Classical Seminary, 56 Ind. 198 (1877); Hyden v. Scott-Lees
Collegiate Institute, 291 Ky. 139, 163 S. W.2d 295 (1942); Re Lord,
175 Misc. 921, 25 N. Y. S.2d 747 (1941); Allegheny College v. National
Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173(1927); Irwin v. Lombard University, 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N. E. 63 (1897).
10. It is generally accepted that consideration is something which
is bargained for in exchange for the promise in question. And the
authorities agree that while that is the general requirement, it does
not exist in the charitable subscription cases. ANSON, CONTRACTS §
126a (Corbin's 5th Am. ed. 1936); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 116;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
11. Charity is usually defined as giving to promote the welfare of
others in need. E.g., 6 WORDS AND PHRASES 640 (1940); 10 Am. JuR.,
Charities § § 2, 3.
12. Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1936);
Landwerlen v. Wheeler, 106 Ind. 524, 5 N. E. 888 (1886); I & I
Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y: 427, 12 N. E.2d 532 (1938).
For other cases see annotations cited supra note 6.
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forbearance on the part of the promisee. 13  The courts us-
ually have assumed reliance instead of requiring it to be
shown, 14 and in no case has reliance been required to be justi-
fied.
The apologists for the results achieved in most of the
charitable subscription cases freely admit that the legal
reasoning laid down in the cases is strained and tenuous.' s
The only justification advanced is that an assumed 6 public
policy requires that charitable subscriptions be legally en-
forceable. No inquiry seems ever to have been undertaken
by courts or commentators to determine whether there are
factual reasons for the creation of a public policy which re-
quires special treatment of charitable subscriptions. Yet
that inquiry is the fundamental question in the charitable
subscription cases.
It is of course true that charities depend for their exist-
ence upon gifts and subscriptions. But it does not necessarily
follow that the existence or even the best interests of chari-
ties require that subscriptions be legally enforceable, since
the long-range advantage of legal enforceability is extremely
doubtful. Many leading charitable organizations follow a pol-
icy of never taking legal action, 1T apparently upon the theory
13. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 140.
14. The courts point to the organization's undertaking a project
or continuing its work and say that that is sufficient reliance to con-
stitute consideration. As a matter of fact, as was pointed out in the
testimony in the principal case and referred to in the dissenting opinion
at p. 336, an organization makes plans on the basis of the aggregate
of subscriptions, estimating the percentage of loss. Thus in no real
sense can it be said that there is any substantial reliance upon any
one subscription.
15. See e.g., Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable
Subscriptions, 12 CORN. L. Q. 467, 479 (1927); Murtaugh, Charitable
Subscriptions in Illinois, 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 430, 441 (1937). It is
revealing to contrast the majority of American cases with a case
which treats all the issues in a strictly legal manner. See the Canadian
case of Dalhousie College v. Boutilier, [1934] Can. Sup. Ct. 642.
16. But see Note 13 CORN. L. Q. 270, 275 (1929), where the author
does suggest that perhaps the courts could well reconsider the policy.
17. In a letter to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, dated December 30,
1948, Charles G. Roswell, Comptroller of the United Hospital Fund
of New York, states categorically, "We do not resort to legal action
in attempting to collect unpaid pledges." Similar statements were
made by Royal C. Agne, national director of fund raising for the
American Red Cross, in a letter dated January 13, 1949, and Laurence
G. Tighe, treasurer of Yale University, in a letter dated December 28,
1948. Of the reported cases, by far the greater number have involved
churches and small colleges and universities. The large, established
charities apparently follow the policy of not suing on subscriptions.
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that such litigation may well cost more by discouraging new
subscriptions than it will gain through collections. The for-
mal subscription, once made, creates a powerful moral com-
pulsion apart from its possible legal implications. There is
a desire to keep one's word, buttressed by the fear of com-
munity censure for the refusal to do so. All available evi-
dence indicates that even without legal action a very large
percentage of such subscriptions are paid.1 And in Eng-
land charities have managed a satisfactory existence though
English courts do not enforce charitable subscriptions. 9
Even assuming, however, that the facts did reveal that
the best interests of charity would be served by the legal
enforceability of subscriptions, that alone does not justify
the judicial creation of a public policy in favor of enforc-
ing them. Preferential treatment under the law is not a
thing to be dealt out every time the word charity is men-
tioned. 20  Such treatment should result only from a searching
inquiry of wide scope,-an inquiry of the type which legisla-
tures are far better adapted to accomplish than are courts.
In other areas the legislatures have not always seen fit to
favor charities. Statutes have included provisions voiding
gifts made to charity within a brief period before the death
of the donor2l and limitations on the proportion of a testator's
estate which may be devised to charity when there are near
relatives surviving.22
Another foundation on which courts have constructed
18. In the letters cited supra note 17, for example, the United
Hospital Fund of New York reports that in the 1946 campaign only
about .1% of the pledges were written off as uncollectible; and in the
1947 campaign less than .2% were so written off. Mr. Agne esti-
mates that about 1% of the amounts pledged in the Red Cross cam-
paigns remains unpaid. In 1926 in an endowment drive Yale Uni-
versity obtained subscriptions for about $20,000,000. Despite the fact
that during the depression of the 1930's no contact was made with
those who did not pay, approximately $19,000,000 has been collected
and some of the subscribers are still paying on their pledges, accord-
ing to Mr. Tighe.
19. In Re Hudson, 54 L. J. Ch. 811 (1885).
20. This is an extremely controversial issue. For a discussion
of statutory preferences see Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institu-
tions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS
144 (1949). For a discussion of the problem as it arises in tort cases
see Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A.2d 761
(1939).
21. CAL. PROBATE CODE ANN. §§ 41-43 (1944); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 113-107 (1933); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-326 (1932); MONT. REV.
CODE § 7015 (1935).
22. Ibid. See also N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 17.
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their public policy is seldom articulated, but is nevertheless
implicit in the cases and in the comment attempting to justify
the cases. It is the feeling that one should be required to
fulfill his promise to a charitable organization because of
the moral obligation to do so. The objection to such reason-
ing is that, even if it could be assumed that courts should
enforce moral obligations, 23 whatever those words may mean,
there are many instances where there may be little or no
moral obligation to pay a subscription. Present day charity
is not always a matter of voluntary giving or promising to
give. The professional "fund raising consultant" has made
his appearance on the American scene. Funds are often
solicited in drives or campaigns conducted by these experts
who use every possible device of psychology and modern ad-
vertising to encourage giving. 24 One standard technique is
to use business and social connections to apply pressure upon
potential givers.25  Such pressure can easily result in sub-
scriptions which are neither wholly spontaneous nor within
the means of the giver. These facts alone should cast doubt
upon the desirability of the public policy in question.
Nor does the policy favoring subscriptions find its sup-
port in the reasonable expectations of the subscriber. It is
extremely unlikely that the layman signing a subscription
believes that he is entering into a legally binding relation-
ship.2  It would, of course, be foolish to contend that the
23. The whole doctrine of consideration assumes that courts do not
enforce mere moral obligations. See ANSON, CONTRACTS, § 127.
24. Fund raising has really become "big business." There are
several large firms which specialize in managing fund raising cam-
paigns; for example, one of the largest is Howard T. Beaver and
Associates in Chicago. At the top level these firms are organized
into a national organization-The American Association of Fund Rais-
ing Counsel. It is strongly recommended to charitable organizations
that the services of fund raising consultants be used if a fund cam-
paign is to be successful. David L. Gafill, Dollar Diplomacy, 24
CHANNELS, No. 5 (1947) (a publication of the National Publicity
Council).
25. It is agreed by the experts on fund raising that the personnel
and organizations enlisted to aid in the campaign to raise money are
of the utmost importance. The more contacts (from which pressure
can be applied) an organization has, the more chance its drive for
funds has for success. Ibid. One fund raising consultant goes so far
as to say that "Money is contributed not so much in ratio to the worth
of the cause as in ratio to the strength of the personalities. .... "
HOWARD T. BEAVER, RAISING MONEY-SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS, TRENDS,
SOLUTIONS (1936) (pamphlet published by Howard T. Beaver and As-
sociates, 612 N. Mich. Ave., Chicago 11, Ill.)
26. A person's actual belief is, of course, immaterial under the
objective theory of contracts. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 21. Belief is
1949]
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average person thinks in terms of legal consideration, but it
is equally foolish to contend that he makes no distinction be-
tween a gratuitous promise to give and that which may in
effect become a lien on his possessions. For most people
the moral obligation engendered by the subscription may well
disappear if circumstances change unexpectedly.27
The factors which have actually influenced the courts to
decide against the charity in the few modern cases which
have reached that result 8 can only be conjectured. 29 Yet the
methods. of big business have moved into the field of chari-
ties. The magnitude and pressure tactics of these -opera-
tions warrant reconsideration of the public policy which has
accorded to charitable subscriptions a preferential position
in the law.
FEDERAL COURTS
EFFECT OF STATE STATUTE ON JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS
A Tennessee corporation acted in Mississippi as realty
agent for a Mississippi resident, without having, qualified to
mentioned here only because it does have a substantial bearing on the
strength of the moral obligation. A person who believes that he is
making a conditional promise certainly does not feel as great a moral
obligation as the person who knows that he is making a binding con-
tract.
27. As pointed out supra note 18, Yale University did not even
contact those who did not pay their subscriptions during the depression
of the 1930's.
28. American University v. Todd, 39 Del. 449, 1 A.2d 595 (1938);
American University v. Conover, 115 N. J. L. 468, 180 Atl. 830 (1935);
Floyd v. Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home, 296 Ky. 196,
176 S. W.2d 125 (1943).
29. In American University v. Conover, supra note 28, as well as
in the principal case, there was present both an "implied promise"
of the organization and the recited promises of others. The decisions
in both cases clearly imply that the courts did not believe these factors
to constitute consideration capable of supporting a contract. In each
case the court took care to point out that there was no evidence that
the organization had taken any substantial action in reliance upon
the subscription despite the general allegations of reliance, which had
been held sufficient in previous cases. This would seem to indicate
that the courts are tending to be less liberal in finding consideration
for charitable subscriptions. However, no recent American case has
been found where a charitable subscription has been held unenforce-
able solely for want of consideration while the subscriber was still
living. Since the subscription has always been considered in contract
terms whether the subscriber has died should make no difference.
But it is possible that the courts are influenced by the policy of the
Wills Acts and hence are more critical toward so-called contracts
which resemble testamentary dispositions.
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